Scientific pluralism, probability and statistics

There are a number of different theories of probability: objectivist, subjectivist, frequentist, Bayesian, etc.  (see, for example, AI: a Modern Approach, 3rd edition, 2010, pg 491) Statistical inferences are then made based upon a variety of competing approaches, each with its own different strengths and weaknesses. (See, for example, S. N. Goodman, Science, vol. 352, 2016, pg 1180)  In general one can not make claims based upon a single estimation of statistical significance, be it Fisher's P value, Bayes factors, or the like. Rather, one needs a pluralistic approach to value/assessment. (In a society of Asa H agents I have used various different value functions/networks.  See, for example, with Asa H light, my blogs of  10 Feb. and  19 Feb. 2011)